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Introduction
Under European regulations, Ireland agreed to cut greenhouse gas emissions to 20% below 1990 levels by 2020, one of the strictest targets in the European Union and indeed the world. Ireland also controls pollutants of air, soil and water. Industry is a significant contributor to climate change and environmental pollution; in 2007 the manufacturing sector (excluding transport) in Ireland accounted for 23% of CO 2 emissions. Regulation has most certainly been the largest factor in driving firm's environmental expenditure and capital investments in equipment for pollution control. The European Union's Emissions Trading System (ETS) for CO 2 permits came into force in January 2005. According to Jaraite et al. (2009) internal (staff) and capital costs accounted for most of the expenditure associated with the introduction of the ETS in Ireland. Certain large-scale industrial and agriculture activities have been subject to the Integrated Pollution Control (IPC) licensing scheme for pollutants of air, soil and water since 1994; in 2003 this scheme was amended and strengthened which gave effect to the Integrated Pollution Prevention Control (IPPC) Directive.
The costs firms have to incur in order to comply with IPPC regulation are capital expenditure to install new equipment, operating costs (e.g. monitoring, external consultant's fees) and costs associated with switching to less polluting inputs (Clinch and Kerins, 2002) . The bulk of the capital costs are incurred when the firm first becomes subject to a license subsequently regular administrative and monitoring costs accrue. Unregulated firms may also incur environmental expenditure or decide to install less polluting equipment if it lowers their production cost. In addition, the trends of firm's displaying increased corporate social responsibility and consumers becoming increasingly green-conscious are likely to be another important contributing factor.
In this paper, we examine two types of expenditure towards pollution control; first we look at firm's current non-capital expenditure on environmental protection and second at firm's capital additions of plant and equipment for the purposes of pollution control. For both types of expenditure we first examine which factors are the key determinants of whether any such expenditure occurs and in a second step we explain how much is spent on each type of expenditure given that it occurs. We analyze recent data from a small open economy, Ireland. The first studies in this area in the 1980s focused on the implications of the introduction of the Clean Air Act in the United States. More recent work has been industry-specific or based on small samples from developing countries. This paper examines the determinants of environmental expenditure in the entire manufacturing sector in Ireland, a developed small open economy. Using data from 2006 and 2007 we capture activity in a market where regulation is mature enough not to be the only factor driving environmental expenditure. Moreover, Ireland is an interesting case to study how its openness in terms of trade and foreign direct investment interacts with environmental expenditure. Jaffe et al. (1995) survey the early literature on environmental regulation and find a mainly negative relationship between regulation and competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing. While compliance with environmental standards is costly for firms, Shadbegian and Gray (2003) find that they are associated with large social returns in the U.S. Over time the literature has examined different factors that affect firm's environmental expenditure or expenditure on pollution abatement; a lot of this literature focuses on the introduction of the Clean Air Act in the U.S. in 1970. Lee and Alm (2004) and references cited therein look at the impact of uncertainties surrounding the enactment and the enforcement of environmental legislation on firm's investment in air pollution abatement equipment. Becker (2004) shows that community characteristics may have an impact on pollution abatement expenditure once firm characteristics are controlled for. In another paper, he also shows that heavy emitters of the substances subject to more stringent regulation generally had higher pollution abatement expenditures (Becker, 2005) . Aden et al. (1999) consider the importance of firm-specific, community and regulatory factors in explaining pollution abatement expenditure in a small sample of Korean manufacturing plants.
They find that plant characteristics are more important than plant-specific regulatory sanctions and community characteristics in explaining plant's expenditure on pollution abatement. Harris (2002, 2005) examine whether foreign-owned firms are more likely to spend and whether they spend more than domestic firms on pollution abatement in the UK metal manufacturing and chemical industry. Controlling for other firm characteristics, they find that the nationality of ownership has different effects on different types of pollution abatement expenditure. Kaiser and Schulze (2003) also focus on the importance of international competition either in the form of foreign ownership or export status on environmental expenditure in Indonesian manufacturing plants. While these factors matter, other firm characteristics are at least as important. A somewhat separate literature analyses the largely firm-specific factors that determine firm's decisions to join voluntary environmental standards or schemes, see Alberini and Segerson (2002) for a survey; Cole et al. (2006) and Bracke et al. (2008) provide two recent examples for Japanese and a sample of large European firms, respectively. Our paper relates most closely to the first set of papers described in the previous paragraph. We examine the effects of firm characteristics and regulatory measures on environmental expenditure and investment by Irish manufacturing firms. In contrast to much of the literature, our dataset covers firms in all subsectors of manufacturing. Our data set covers 2006 and 2007, more recent than the data used in the literature surveyed above. Changes in firms' and consumers' attitudes to pollution and the environment may well have changed the determinants of firms' environmental expenditure. We are able to distinguish between different types of environmental expenditure: we focus in particular on current environmental expenditure and capital investment for pollution abatement equipment. The determinants behind the two types of expenditure are likely to differ.
Only a small fraction of firms in Irish manufacturing report positive values for environmental protection: 28% of firms report a positive figure for current environmental expenditure and 10% for capital investment in pollution control. Larger, more energy intensive, and exporting firms are more likely to spend current resources at all. The same holds for firms under the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control directive. Once the decision to commit resources has been taken, larger firms, firms that are foreign-owned, and firms that report low shares of water and refuse charges in turnover have higher current environmental expenditure. Exporting firms are more likely to invest in pollution control equipment. Once the decision to invest has been taken, larger firms and firms that report high shares of water and refuse charges invest more in equipment for pollution control.
Taken together, this suggests that regulatory, cost and image factors are currently driving Irish manufacturing firms' environmental expenditure.
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows: Section 2 outlines data sources and methodology, Section 3 presents our results, Section 4 discusses robustness and Section 5 concludes.
Data and Methodology
Our data set is the Census of Industrial Production (CIP) for the Republic of Ireland. The CIP is conducted annually by the Central Statistics Office (CSO). The CIP covers all firms with 3 or more persons engaged in the mining, manufacturing and utilities sectors. The analysis here focuses on the core manufacturing NACE Rev. 1.1 sectors 15-37. The CIP is conducted at enterprise and local unit level. The information of interest to us is collected only in the enterprise data. The main variables collected in the CIP are turnover, exports, purchases, fuel, additions to capital assets, sales of capital assets, indirect taxes, employment, earnings, other labour costs. There are two questionnaires -one for firms with between three and twenty persons engaged (Form C) and one for firms with twenty or more persons engaged (Form F). Questions on current environmental expenditure and on capital investments in equipment for pollution control have been collected since 2006 and are only included in Form F. We use the two most recent years of available data -2006 and 2007. There are 9,658 observations from 5,864 firms in the full CIP in these two years. There are 1,777 firms that filled in form F in these two years. However, due to changes in the workforce some firms incorrectly fill in form F while others incorrectly fill in form C. We exclude those firms that filled in form F despite being below the 20 employee threshold from the analysis. This reduces the potential sample to 3,225 observations. 
is statistically significant, the two decisions on whether to spend and how much to spend are related. In this case, estimating an equation only for the decision how much to spend would induce sample selection bias. This can by avoided by estimating the two equations jointly (Heckman 1979) . In the estimation of our model, we adjust the standard errors for clustering at the firm level.
We expect firm size to have a positive impact both on a firm's propensity to spend on the environment/invest in pollution abatement and the amount it spends. Other things equal, larger firms are more likely to be more polluting and there may be economies of scale in environmental expenditure. The effect of firm age might be ambiguous. Older firms might have lower resource constraints both in terms of recorded assets and in their ability to obtain funding. Although staff mobility is present in these industries, older firms are also likely to possess a more experienced staff profile. This experience should lead to a more efficient production process, all other things equal. In contrast, younger firms' machinery should be more recent with some new technology already incorporated. This new technology is likely to take account of the increasingly demanding environmental standards. As a result it may be cheaper for them to invest in additional measures.
Exporting and foreign-owned firms are subject to pollution regulation in several countries. While Irish standards are similar or identical to European Union standards, which tend to be high compared to the rest of the world, firms may still be exporting to countries where standards are yet more stringent. It also appears to be the case that more environmentally conscious firms are more likely to export (Galdeano-Gomez, 2010) . Thus, the direction of causality between exporting and environmental expenditure could go both ways and we expect a positive correlation. Moreover, exporting firms tend to be more productive than non-exporters (e.g. Ruane and Sutherland (2005) for Ireland). Hence, if more productive firms use more advanced technology, this would be another reason to expect a positive relationship between exporting and spending on the environment or investing capital in pollution control. The subsidiaries of foreign-owned multinationals also tend to be more productive than domestic firms (e.g. Barry et al. (1999) for Ireland), therefore a similar argument holds. Besides, foreign multinationals may apply the same standards across their operations in all (Western) countries, these could be higher than those prescribed by Irish legislation. Multinationals are also likely to be subject to more public scrutiny regarding their efforts to protect the environment. Both of these arguments also point towards a positive correlation.
We expect firms that are more energy intensive to require more current environmental expenditure or capital investment in pollution reduction due to the emissions created by their typically high use of fossil fuels. We also include the share of water and refuse charges in turnover on the assumption that firms who report significant charges in these areas are likely to commit expenditure to lower these charges.
2 Clinch and Kerins (2002) document that in the food and drink sector, the bulk of IPPC-related expenditure is for water treatment in their analysis of the composition of expenditure of 46 Irish manufacturing and construction firms subject to the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) directive between 1996 and 1999.
For the estimated Heckman model to be meaningful the selection equation requires at least one "instrument" that determines a firm's choice of spending on the environment or investing capital in pollution control but not how much is spent. We use two such variables, IPPC and ETS. These variables are designed to capture, respectively, the firm being under the Irish Environmental Protection Agency's Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control scheme (IPPC) and the firm being a member of the European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). Firms under the IPPC are constrained on the amount of pollution they can emit. Firms face the option of reducing emissions (either through a more environmentally friendly production process or through less production) or punishment (e.g. fines or possibly even closure) by the regulator for breaking the terms of their emission permit. The IPCC has greater scope than the EU ETS which solely targets carbon dioxide emissions (Environmental Protection Agency, 2010a) . Assuming the constraint is binding the firm either faces the choice of committing resources towards pollution abatement or reducing output. We assume the marginal cost of pollution abatement to be lower than the cost of reducing output (at least at low pollution abatement levels) and hence expect firms within this scheme to commit to spending on pollution abatement.
The CIP does not directly record regulation by IPPC or ETS, so we form proxies instead. Based on the legislation published by the EPA (Department of Environment, 2006) and the firms subject to the licensing scheme listed on the EPA website (Environmental Protection Agency, 2010b) , we identify five NACE 2-digit sectors and twelve separate NACE 3-digit sectors to which IPPC could potentially apply. We are able to estimate likely levels of employees above which firms would be required to be in IPPC. We placed a low turnover constraint of €100,000 and an employee constraint of 30/40 people depending on the industry (see Table 4 tonnes and a NACE code in one of the four relevant sectors are assigned a value of one for our ETS proxy.
Results
Descriptive Statistics Table 1 3 Our results are robust to a using the UK threshold of 10,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions. 4 Clinch and Kerins (2002) argue that current environmental expenditure may be quite high because the administrative work involved with IPPC is considerable. Where firms are unable or unwilling to run a permanent section concerned with environmental matters, they often employ consultants when necessary to carry out, inter alia, the monitoring of emissions and preparation of reports. emissions. One explanation for this finding is that firms are better able to pass on the increased costs due to the imposition of the ETS scheme than those associated with the IPPC scheme. There are two possible explanations for the negative correlation between environmental expenditure and water and refuse charges. One is that the administrative and monitoring costs associated with water treatment for those firms subject to the IPPC directive are lower than those for other substances.
Regression results
The other explanation is that water and refuse charges are really a specific type of environmental expenditure and therefore for firms with high water and refuse charges other types of environmental expenditure are second order.
The results from the selection equation for capital investment in equipment for pollution control as presented in the second column of Table 2 expenditure is more feasible to large companies due to a combination of greater economies of scale (the coefficient on firm size is significantly smaller than one) in the provision of the services and the greater likelihood of both image benefits and regulation enforcement on large firms. In contrast to much of the literature we do not find a significant effect for firm age in either the selection or the regression model. This may be because with the lower bound on firm size of 20 employees in our sample there are too few very young firms to obtain sufficient variation.
While Kaiser and Schulze (2003) find a positive effect of exporting status on a firm's propensity to have environmental expenditure and a negative effect on the amount they spend, our results suggest that exporters are more likely to commit resources to environmental expenditure and also to capital investment for pollution control. As Irish-owned exporters are more productive than Irish-owned non-exporters (Ruane and Sutherland, 2005) this might indicate that they invest in new technology more frequently or that their products are subject to higher environmental standards than those of non-exporters. Foreign ownership has a positive effect on the amount of environmental expenditure.
This is in line with Kaiser and Schulze (2003) , but Aden et al. (2006) find that domestic Korean firms spend more on pollution abatement and for Harris (2002, 2005) the results differ by type of expenditure, nationality of foreign ownership and industry. Kaiser and Schulze (2003) argue that this may be because these firms are more environmentally conscious or because they apply more efficient and environmentally friendly technologies company wide.
Kaiser and Schulze (2003) find a positive and significant effect of energy intensity both on the firm's propensity to spending on the environment as well as on the amount they spend. In our regressions energy intensity only plays a marginal role in the decision to invest in equipment for pollution control. As indicated above, the fact that being subject to IPPC licence is a significant determinant of environmental expenditure in our models suggests that environmental expenditure in the Irish context is much more likely to be associated with pollution from substances other than CO 2 .
Robustness

7
One source of bias in the data could be due to firms receiving the wrong survey form. Form C should only be completed by firms with less than twenty persons engaged. Form F should only be completed by firms with twenty or more persons engaged. Errors may arise due to firms changing their workforce so that they cross the twenty persons engaged threshold. Firms with more than 20
persons engaged who received Form C could not report their environmental expenditure or capital spending on equipment for pollution control. This may bias our results if there are substantial 7 The results that are described in this section but are not reported are available from the authors on request.
structural differences between the firms who received the wrong survey form and the firms who received the correct form. Table 3 shows means and standard deviations of the firms in the sample, firms that incorrectly filled in form C and firms that incorrectly filled in form F.
Apart from the inherent differences in firm size, both groups of firms that received the wrong forms are on average younger than the firms in the sample. The firms with more than 20 persons engaged that incorrectly filled in Form C have an average age of just half that in the sample suggesting that this is a group of young fast-growing firms. In the two groups that did not fill in the correct form there are fewer foreign-owned firms than in the sample. In all instances the differences between the two groups that received the wrong forms are smaller than the differences between each group and the averages in the sample used. Only a small percentage (5.2%) of firms who incorrectly completed form F record a value of one for our IPPC proxy. This is related to the high probability of these firms being relatively small. If we expanded the IPPC proxy to potentially include firms who completed form C incorrectly, only a few additional firms would record a value of one. The sectoral split of the firms who incorrectly filled out forms C and F is not significantly different from each other or from the overall dataset. Given the similarities between firms that incorrectly completed forms C and F we do not expect these sampling issues to be associated with large inherent biases in our analysis. As the information on environmental expenditure and on capital investment in equipment for pollution is provided by the firms with less that 20 persons engaged that filled in form F, we estimate a specification of our models where we include these firms. The results from these separate regressions are not significantly different from the results reported in Table 2 .
We varied the threshold limits to examine the sensitivity of our results to the definition of the IPPC and ETS variables. In the main regression in Table 2 
Summary and Conclusions
This paper examines the determinants of environmental expenditure and investment in equipment for pollution control among Irish manufacturing firms in 2006 and 2007. As regards environmental expenditure we find that larger firms, firms that export and firms that are subject to the IPPC directive are more likely to spend resources at all. Once the decision to commit resources has been taken, larger firms, firms that are foreign-owned, and firms that report a low share of water and refuse charges in turnover have higher environmental expenditure. With respect to investment in equipment for pollution control we find exporting and firms with a high energy intensity are more likely to invest at all. Once the decision to invest has been taken, larger firms and firms that face higher water and refuse charges invest more in equipment for pollution control.
Taken together this suggests that regulatory factors are an important driver of environmental expenditure. This is particularly the case for current environmental expenditure, suggesting that the monitoring and administrative costs necessary to comply with regulation are important. In terms of firm characteristics, size, export status and foreign ownership are significant determinants of environmental expenditure. These firms are likely to have more resources, but they may also be subject to more public scrutiny regarding their efforts to reduce pollution either through stock markets or by customers abroad. In this regard, the openness of the Irish economy appears to be associated with higher environmental expenditure. High water and refuse charges are associated with lower current environmental expenditure but higher capital investment in equipment for pollution control. This is consistent with Cinch and Kerins ' (2002) finding that the bulk of environmental expenditure goes towards reducing pollution from one main firm-or sector-specific substances covered by the IPPC directive.
Current environmental expenditure and capital investment in pollution control is mainly directed at reducing air and water pollution rather than carbon dioxide emissions. The introduction of IPPC licenses has clearly driven the reduction in water and air pollution, yet in contrast to CO 2 emissions no target levels have been set for these other pollutants. As our measures of environmental expenditure are silent on the associated reduction in pollution achieved, the paper offers a snapshot of the factors that currently drive firm's environmental expenditure. Next to regulation image and cost concerns appear to be crucial. 
Department of Environment 2006, Environmental Protection Agency Act 1992 (Established
Appendix Variable Descriptions
environ:
Total current expenditure on environmental protection in 1,000€.
environsel:
A dummy variable equal to 1 if environ is greater than zero.
capoll:
Total capital expenditure on pollution control and anti-pollution accessories in 1,000€.
capollsel:
A dummy variable equal to 1 if capoll is greater than zero.
size:
Total number of persons engaged in the firm.
age:
Firm age (earliest year of incorporation recorded is 1900)
export:
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm reports a positive share of exports.
foreign:
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the location of the ultimate benefactor of the firms activities is outside Ireland.
enint:
Energy intensity = total fuel used/total turnover.
watersh:
Total expenditure on water and refuse charges as a share of turnover.
ETS:
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is predicted to be a member of the European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme. Details are set out in Section 2.
IPPC:
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is predicted to be a member of the Irish Environmental Protection Agency's Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control scheme. Details are set out in Section 2 and 
